



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 9

'Strong Man' Regime in Chile

by Robert J. Alexander

1953 Inflation, the discrediting of all major political parties, the highhanded government of President Gabriel Gonzales Videla, a Radical, nationalism, and the ineptitude of the United States are five factors which hold the key to the victory in Chile's presidential election of September 5, 1952 of ex-dictator General Carlos Ibañez, who was inaugurated on November 3, 1952.

For 15 years Chile has been suffering from inflation, which is due to the exigencies of World War II, the effects of the world-wide inflation since 1945, and the fact that the country's economic development and industrialization program have been largely financed by price increases. Inflation has been particularly hard on wage and salary earners. The almost unbroken series of strikes since World War II has only served to keep the workers' wages a few paces behind prices. Today there is a feeling of desperation among Chile's urban workers.

This desperation can find no outlet through any of the old Chilean parties. All except the parties which backed General Ibañez had been in the government of President Gonzalez Videla. Even the Communists served in

his cabinet during his first six months in office. An extremely agile politician, Gonzalez Videla arranged to nullify all effective opposition among the old-line politicians.

Of all the political groups the Leftist parties have failed most conspicuously. The Radicals, dominant element in the government since 1939, have become corrupt and worn out with long years in office. They have shown a disconcerting tendency to shift ideological ground with every change of the political wind. Last summer we heard many Chileans say, "The main thing to do is to throw the Radicals out!"

The Socialists are even more discredited. They have shown inability to make up their minds concerning what they believe and to follow any consistent political strategy. They have an acute inferiority complex with respect to the Communists. During the recent election campaign the Socialists split into three different groups, one supporting Ibañez, another backing Gonzalez' candidate, Pedro Enrique Alfonso, and a third naming a candidate of its own, Senator Salvador Allende, who ran with Communist support.

The Communists are in no better position.

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They did not make a brilliant record during their six months in the government. Since then they have made it clear that their main objective is to destroy the Chilean economy so as to make its resources unavailable to the United States. For the time being, at least, they have lost their chance, as shown by the fact that areas of the country which a few years ago were overwhelmingly Communist in this election voted strongly for Ibañez.

The highhanded methods used by President Gonzalez Videla during his six years in office contributed to the discrediting of the political parties. First an intimate ally of the Communists, giving them numerous public posts and turning the labor movement over to them, Gonzalez Videla then opposed the Communists and pushed through Congress a bill to outlaw them. The famous "Law for the Defense of Democracy" was originally intended to drive the Communists out of political life, but Gonzalez Videla did not scruple to use it against members of other parties who opposed his regime.

Discontent Helped Ibañez

General Ibañez has played on all of these causes of discontent. Without any very clear concept of the nature of the problems facing the country, Ibañez has sought to capitalize on the desperation of the workers over rising prices and the desperation of the average citizen over the failure of the political parties, and has added a generous touch of nationalist appeal.

Ibañez still thinks of government

as the prerogative of the "strong man." Whether he will be a dictator probably depends on the necessities of the moment—and on whether the Army will follow him in such an attempt. He won the election without the backing of any powerful party. The only group with any clear ideology which supported him is the Partido Socialista Popular, but it is very weak. Ibañez is reported to have told an important labor leader that "the Socialistas Populares won't be in my government more than three months."

Ibañez and Perón

The other parties backing Ibañez were the Agrario Laboristas, a non-descript group which has risen rapidly in recent years as a vehicle of popular discontent, but without any defined ideology or program; the Partido Feminista; and a small dissident Radical faction. But Ibañez does not owe his election to any political party. He owes it to the situation in which the country finds itself and to his own *misica*.

Ibañez speaks much of the "economic independence" of Chile, and many of his supporters talk of the necessity for forming a bloc of Latin American raw-material producers to deal with the United States—an idea which sits well with Chile's neighbor, General Perón.

There is little doubt that Perón gave active support to Ibañez. In private conversations with visitors from Chile Perón frequently expressed his hope that Ibañez would win. The Argentine government actively subsidized the Ibañez cam-

paign both in Chile and among Chileans resident in Argentina.

This help from Perón, however, does not seem to have made much impression on Chilean voters. Gonzalez Videla's assertions concerning Argentine interference were taken to be "just campaign talk." Moreover, many Chileans who might have been worried under other circumstances felt that Ibañez would not be a tool of Perón. This writer, also, believes that Ibañez may well prove as great a disappointment to Perón as was Getulio Vargas of Brazil.

Although Ibañez is not likely to be a tool of Perón, he will probably cause some rude shocks to the United States. It is possible that he will repudiate the recently signed United States-Chilean military treaty. This treaty, proposed six months before the presidential elections, was one of the most inept instances of United States diplomacy in Latin America in many a year. A more certain way to deliver votes to an anti-United States candidate could hardly be selected.

This diplomatic blunder is only one evidence of the failure of many United States policy-makers to see that the cold war in Latin America is not a matter of armies and navies but of politics and economics. As a result, the United States is losing the cold war in Latin America, as the election of General Ibañez amply shows.

(Dr. Alexander, assistant professor of economics at Rutgers University and author of *The Perón Era*, published by Columbia University Press in 1951, spent two months in Latin America last summer.)

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The Prague Trials: Before and After

The trials of 14 prominent Czechoslovak Communists charged with treason, including Rudolf Slansky, former secretary general of the Czechoslovak Communist party, and Dr. Vladimir Clementis, former foreign minister, which ended with the execution of 11 of the accused and life imprisonment for 3, profoundly shocked the non-Communist world. The shock was felt not only because the drama enacted in Prague was a case of the Communist revolution devouring its own leaders—this had happened many times in the U.S.S.R. and most Westerners feel little sympathy for any Communists, pro- or anti-Russian—but because the trials spotlighted the alleged affiliations of the accused with the Zionist movement and with Israel, and were therefore interpreted as an ominous new chapter in world communism, the chapter of anti-Semitism. Reports on December 18 that Poland had accused the Israeli legation in Warsaw of abusing its diplomatic privileges by seeking “to promote the growth of Zionist organizations liquidated in Poland a long time ago” presaged an onslaught there, too, on Communists of Jewish faith.

This onslaught, in the opinion of veteran non-Communist observers, is motivated not by racial but by economic and international considerations. In Russia under Tsarism the Jews had been condemned to a ghetto-like existence in the Jewish “pale” and subjected to recurring pogroms—a fate from which distinguished Russian-born Jews like Chaim Weizmann, the late first president of Israel, had sought to save his coreligionists. By contrast, the Communist leaders in the early years

of the revolution endeavored to wipe out anti-Semitism. The 1936 constitution, adopted in a period when political and economic tension seemed to be somewhat eased, prescribed drastic penalties for persons guilty of racial discrimination. While the Jews were thus afforded wider political and educational opportunities than they had enjoyed in Tsarist days, they suffered economically—not because of discrimination on racial grounds but because the government, under its program of state ownership of resources and planned large-scale industrialization, wiped out small businesses, many of which were owned by Jews. Growing Great Russian nationalism has also stressed the assimilation, not only of Jews, but of other non-Great Russian groups, notably the Ukrainians and the Uzbeks.

Zionism and Economics

Since World War II anti-Semitism of a character familiar to the Western world has been on the rise in the U.S.S.R. This development was attributed by some students of Russian affairs to the impact of Nazi propaganda and actions during the period of German occupation. It has become increasingly evident, however, that official hostility toward the Jews was due to the Kremlin's determination to cut off all contacts with the Western world. The Zionist movement, which offered one of the few remaining channels for such contacts, had been viewed with disfavor by Moscow before 1945. The creation in 1948 of the state of Israel, which became a magnet for Jews of many countries who saw in it the long-awaited fulfillment of their dreams

for a homeland of their own, sharpened the issue.

While the U.S.S.R., in the United Nations, endorsed the partition of Palestine, thereby incurring Arab wrath, it soon became apparent that the Communists of Eastern Europe were alarmed by the desire of the Jewish communities that had survived Nazism to seek new homes in Israel. Not only did this desire appear to the Communists as a slur on conditions the Jews were seeking to leave behind. The Communists of Eastern Europe, as was made clear in the Prague trials, also resented the removal, no matter how restricted, of Jewish possessions to Israel, charging that this removal weakened the economies of the respective countries.

Had the economies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria been in a flourishing condition, the economic aspect of Communist anti-Zionism might have been less significant than the opposition of communism to all non-Communist international movements—as evidenced by opposition to the international role of the Vatican, recently denounced anew, this time by anti-Moscow Yugoslavia. The countries of Eastern Europe, however, are in the midst of severe economic difficulties. These difficulties, so far as available sources of information reveal, are due in part to overhasty industrialization and peasant resistance to collectivization (evident also in Yugoslavia), in part to the demands made by the U.S.S.R. on the production of its Eastern European satellites, whose output of consumer goods, among other things, has helped to improve Russian living

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What Should the New Administration Do in Western Europe?

by James P. Warburg

Mr. Warburg, who served during the war as Deputy Director, Overseas Branch, Office of War Information, is the author of many books, pamphlets and articles on problems of American foreign policy, including "Germany: Nation or No-Man's Land" published in the *Headline Series*. Among his most recent books are *Last Call for Common Sense* and *Program for Peace*.

THE growing crisis in NATO is perhaps the most difficult and the most dangerous of the many problems inherited by the Eisenhower Administration. Western Europe is in open revolt against our stubbornly imposed policy of making Germany the keystone in the arch of Western defense. The peoples of Europe think that we are forcing them against their better judgment to put the military cart before the political and economic horses.

Shotgun Marriage

In Britain the Churchill government obtained ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties by a narrow margin over the solid opposition of the Labor party. French ratification seems highly improbable unless the treaties are modified in such a manner as to give France real guarantees against German domination or betrayal, as well as vastly greater assistance in resisting the Vietminh in Indochina and in keeping abreast of German rearmament in Europe. Even the West Germans, who have the most to gain from the treaties, have hesitated for seven months—in spite of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's determined efforts—to ratify an agreement which leaves 18 million of their compatriots more or less permanently enslaved to Soviet tyranny. Italy and the Benelux countries are waiting to see what happens to the Washington-sponsored shotgun marriage of the two ancient rivals, France and Germany.

If the European Defense Community fails to come into existence, the heart will have been cut out of

the whole NATO plan. But this is not all. Even if the treaties should be ratified, it is now clear that the whole program of rearmament, agreed upon last February at Lisbon, has been knocked into a cocked hat. Every participant, including the United States, now knows that it undertook commitments beyond its power to fulfill. The Europeans are talking about "stretch-outs"; we ourselves have fallen far behind in our promised deliveries of arms and equipment. In part this is due to over-optimistic estimates of capabilities, but in even greater measure, it is due to something like a tacit sit-down strike in the whole Atlantic community resulting from a diminished sense of urgency.

Thus, the problem which faces the new Administration is twofold: the present NATO plan rests upon a forced marriage of France and Germany which is acceptable to neither party; beyond that, the whole concept of costly rapid rearmament is repugnant to Europe because Europe does not agree with Washington's appraisal of Soviet intentions. It is fortunate indeed that a new Administration can face these facts without having its judgment impaired by any need to justify the past mistakes which have brought us to this dangerous pass.

Three Courses

What courses of action are open to us?

1. *The Hoover-MacArthur course.* We can wash our hands of Europe in disgust at its "unwillingness" to defend itself and retire into an

"American Gibraltar of Freedom." Fortunately, it is unlikely that General Eisenhower will adopt any such defeatist policy.

2. *The Truman-Acheson course.* We can continue the attempt to bull our way ahead, seeking to cajole, browbeat and bribe the European nations into acceptance of the present plan. This involves additional commitments to France, with respect both to financial assistance in Europe and Asia and to the permanence of our garrison in Europe, which the Eighty-third Congress is unlikely to approve. It involves also making the overt threat to France that if it does not fall into line, we shall not only permit but help West Germany to create its own national army. In other words, it means in the last analysis willingness to write off France altogether in order to place our European bet on Germany. This has, in fact, been the trend of our policy since 1947—a trend which this writer has vigorously opposed at every step along the way.

3. *Exploring an all-German settlement.* The Truman-Acheson regime has rendered lip-service to our original postwar aim of creating a united, demilitarized, democratic Germany. Actually, since 1947 our government has so fallen in love with its cold-war plan that it has lost all desire to explore the possibilities of an all-German settlement. It has taken the position that there is no use in talking to the Russians until a "situation of strength" has been created in Western Europe. It has then set out to create that "situation of strength"

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by General Frank L. Howley

General Howley, vice-chancellor of New York University, led the first road convoy on July 17, 1945 into Berlin, where he became the United States Commandant and negotiated four-power agreements with Russia, France and Britain. This article is based on a section in his forthcoming book, *Your War for Peace*, to be published this month by Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, N.Y., \$2.75.

ALL Germans want a united Germany, the kind which was planned by a solemn agreement signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. France was not in on the deal because France's voice in German matters was not recognized until after the Potsdam conference in 1945. The West German looks to East Germany as a place where his relatives and friends live. He does not consider East Germany as East Germany; he considers it as Middle Germany. The area up near Poland, including East Prussia, to him is the eastern part of Germany. I have been assured by many West Germans that they are quite willing to sacrifice a large part of their present economic well-being in order to help their eastern brothers who have been plundered and exploited unmercifully by the Soviet Union.

German Desire for Unity

West Germany, in many respects, is doing fairly well. The Marshall plan has served a most useful purpose. The late Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher said it helped a great deal to raise the living standard, even though he did criticize the way it was handled. Franz Bluecher, German minister for the Marshall plan and deputy chancellor, an informed, brilliant and rather shrewd businessman, also gives great credit to the help which this American investment gave to the German people. He said the way to judge the Marshall plan is to look at the results, and the results show that the German worker is better off today than he has ever

been in his history, so far as standard of living goes.

After talking with Bluecher, with German industrial leaders, and with many others, it comes out about as follows: West Germany wants to be reunited with East Germany and is willing to make economic sacrifices. East Germany is desperately anxious to be reunited with West Germany and to be rid of the domination and slavery which have been brought to them by the Soviet system. East Germany, or rather the Soviet zone of occupation, has already been stripped by the Soviets to the tune of approximately \$9 billion worth of goods from current production. This means that recently manufactured goods to that amount have been taken out of East Germany and sent to the Soviet Union and its satellites.

This is almost equal to the amount which was demanded by the Russians as one of the prices for a united Germany. At that time, 1945, they planned to take approximately \$10 billion worth of goods from current production from the entire united German economy. At that time we were unwilling to pay that price, along with the other prices which the Russians demanded. I notice that in recent statements on the question of the East being united with the West, this item is no longer mentioned by our foreign representatives. Apparently they are quite willing to have that forgotten, to let the Russians benefit. In addition to this loss, which has caused the Eastern Germans to be kept poor with a low living standard, while the Western Germans have improved their condi-

tions—thanks partly to our putting in approximately \$3,550,141,000—there are other factors we should consider.

Cost of Unification

If the usual diplomatic agreement is made, allowing the two Germans to be united, such an agreement—if it lives up to past agreements between East and West—will probably be handled in such a careless, trusting manner that the Russians will perform additional dismantlings and will move with them everything which can be moved, from surplus food supplies to raw materials. This is what they did in the United States sector of Berlin before giving it up. This is what they did in Saxony and Thuringia, which we turned over to them. It is generally agreed that West Germany must prepare great quantities of food and raw materials to rush into the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany if and when the Russians move out. What the total cost will be might be arrived at as follows:

I discussed this matter with Bluecher of the Marshall plan, but because I made no notes at the time and because I have spoken with many other leaders since then, I am not too sure that the following figures are in complete accord with those he had in mind. The total Reich assets as of 1936 were about 470 billion reichsmarks. If you allow for increased prices and inflation since that date, which have pushed values up about 72 percent, this gives a total value of approximately 800 billion reichsmarks. One-third of this was in the Soviet zone of Germany. When you make various estimates as to how much of value the Soviets have taken out, how much of value they can haul out at the last minute before turning over the zone, you arrive at a figure of approximately 90 billion

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Warburg

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by a course of action which, if completed, would make an all-German settlement all but impossible.

This writer happens to think that the attempt to create strength by including in NATO the rearmed two-thirds of a divided Germany was, from the outset, an ill-advised and dangerous plan. It is not, however, necessary to share this view in order to understand the imperatives of the situation which have now arisen. Whether the plan was wise or foolish, the plain fact is that it cannot now be carried into effect, unless the peoples of Europe become convinced—as they are not now—that no better alternative exists.

The powerful and growing opposition forces in the various countries of Europe derive their strength from many different causes of dissatisfaction, but they all have one thing in common. They are not satisfied with Washington's a priori assumption that Moscow's rather far-reaching proposals have been nothing more than a bluff intended merely to obstruct and delay Western plans.

There is only one way to satisfy this demand and that is to call Russia's hand. The Truman-Acheson regime has been unwilling to do this for fear that the Russians might not be bluffing and that an all-German settlement might be shown to be attainable on the sole condition that there should be no German participation of any sort in the NATO alliance. Last March our government, in fact, informed the Kremlin that it would agree to an all-German settlement only if all of Germany would then become a partner in NATO. This was tantamount to saying: "Give us the kind of Germany we want and we shall then do with all of Germany precisely what you wish to prevent us from doing with two-thirds of Germany." As pointed out

by the *London Times*, no reasonable person could expect the Russians to agree to any such proposal.

The first essential of a new approach would have to be the declaration that if a satisfactory all-German settlement could be obtained, the Western powers would drop the idea of getting a military contribution to the NATO alliance from Germany. It is unlikely that there would be any objection to this from London or Paris, but so far as our government is concerned, this would mean a sharp reversal of the Truman-Acheson policy.

Calling Russia's Hand

In Germany itself the majority of the people would probably welcome unification on the basis of neutrality guaranteed by the four powers, but such a solution would undoubtedly be fought tooth and nail by the present West German government. The reason is simple. Konrad Adenauer, hand-picked by Washington as the first chancellor of the Bonn Republic, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the State Department policy precisely because he was shrewd enough to see that it would make Germany the dominant West European power and place it in a position to play off Russia against the West, much as Adenauer's close friend, Gustav Stresemann, had maneuvered in the early days of the Weimar Republic. Having with great skill finessed West Germany into an almost incredible position of power within seven years of abject humiliation, the last thing in the world the chancellor would like to see would be a uniting of the two Germanys on the basis of demilitarized neutrality.

The choice confronting the Eisenhower Administration is, therefore, not only between France and Germany, but between backing German nationalism or German democracy.

In a more fundamental sense it is the choice between seeking peace through restoring the unity of Germany and, eventually, the unity of Europe or seeking peace through a precarious balance of power in a permanently divided Europe—a balance depending upon the loyalty to the West of a restless, unnatural and as yet unregenerate West German state.

Can there be any assurance that a sincere effort will, at this late date, actually bring about an acceptable all-German settlement? No. There can be no such assurance. But one thing is certain: unless a sincere effort is made, the NATO treaties—even if ratified—will never be carried through in such a way as to achieve their purpose. The NATO plan can be rescued from failure only by proving to the peoples of Western Europe that Russia—and Russia alone—stands in the way of an honorable and satisfactory all-German settlement.

The only way to provide that proof is for the Western powers to come forward with a concrete proposal for a German treaty. The first step in working out such a proposal is to do what neither former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes nor General Marshall nor Mr. Acheson succeeded in doing—namely, to develop a policy with respect to Germany that could be wholeheartedly accepted by France. Only when this has been done will it be possible for the three Western powers to take the initiative in a conference with Russia. Only then will it be possible to face Moscow with the choice of accepting what Europe considers a just settlement or else openly assuming the role of dog in the European manger.

If Moscow then accepts the proposal, the first great step will have been taken toward a European peace settlement. If Moscow rejects a proposal which the peoples of Europe

consider just and desirable, then at least the psychological precondition for the present NATO plan will have been created.

Note: The writer has prepared for submission to the incoming Administration a concrete proposal for an all-German settlement dealing with the following six major problems: (1) the frontiers of the new German nation, (2) Germany's rights as to militarization, (3) Germany's rights as to alliances, (4) the political organization of Germany, (5) the economic structure of Germany, (6) reparations. This proposal will be made available by the author to any readers of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN who may wish to see it.

Howley

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reichsmarks, which must be put back into East Germany in order to give the people an adequate standard of living and to equalize their economic levels with those of West Germany. This amount could not possibly be put back in less than six years—so somebody has to create or ship into the Soviet zone of Germany about \$4 billion worth of goods a year for approximately six years. If you are optimistic, as most German leaders are who know the tremendous energy of the East Germans, you will calculate that at least two-thirds of this amount of money will not have to be shipped into East Germany but will be the result of the productive capacity and the energies of the people in the East zone. That leaves, however, approximately \$8 billion which must be sent into the East zone of Germany from either West Germany or outside sources. What will be needed will be either a German Marshall plan to help the people in the Eastern part of the country or another Marshall plan supported by the United States.

It is easy to see that this \$8 billion is very close to the estimate of \$9 billion which the Russians have taken out and which they demanded as one of the original prices of a united Germany. If we are going to let them get away with this, we might

just as well have accepted their conditions in the first place and saved ourselves all the trouble. Of course, one of the other conditions was a political setup for a united Germany which would have given the Russians and the Communist party domination over the entire political life of Germany. If any arrangement is now made politically which enables their Communist party in East Germany to gain complete control of the entire German machinery, we might just as well have given up that point in the first place too; and I, for one, who have seen how shortsighted our foreign representatives are, how easily they forget what happened yesterday, am not too optimistic on either count.

This and other problems dealing with Germany constitute unfinished business of the United States and its Allies as we now terminate Military Government and High Commission rule over the life of what remains to us of Germany.

Spotlight

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standards instead of their own. It was obviously expedient for Communist leaders who support the Kremlin to blame existing shortages on the international machinations of officials in one way or another connected with foreign policy and international trade and to emphasize the possibility that the removal of Jewish financial assets to Israel in accordance with an alleged well-planned conspiracy had undermined the economic situation.

While this is merely a hypothesis, it is also possible that the Kremlin has been disappointed with the results so far achieved by the drive for world trade which it launched at the Moscow conference last May. The admission that Eastern Europe, probably to a greater extent than the

U.S.S.R., which has been able to draw to its neighbors' resources, is suffering from the decline in East-West trade would involve an intolerable loss of "face." The anti-Zionist charges in Prague thus afford a double-edged weapon. At one and the same time they strike at the "cosmopolitanism" of pro-Zionist Jews and justify the economic difficulties of Eastern Europe.

Anti-Zionism Woos Arabs

But anti-Zionism, as was promptly noted, also gives a new tool to Soviet diplomacy. At a time when the Middle East, already gripped by rising nationalism and economic crises, is disturbed by what the Arabs regard as the West's disregard for the interests of Iran, Tunisia and Morocco, the Kremlin, by portraying Israel as the center of Western-supported conspiracy, can hope to encourage, if not the sympathy of the Moslems for the U.S.S.R., at least their increasing hostility to Britain, France and the United States. It is unrealistic to assume that the U.S.S.R. provoked, in the first instance, the ferment now at work in the Middle East and North Africa. This ferment was developing before Lenin seized power in 1917, and would not be allayed merely by the defeat of Russia or the suppression of communism. The Soviet leaders, however, have an opportunity to capitalize on maladjustments which the Western powers, for a variety of reasons, have been slow or even reluctant to modify. By opposing Israel, whose attraction for the Jews of Eastern Europe had already aroused the resentment of the U.S.S.R., the Kremlin hopes to keep the Arab countries from joining a Middle East defense pact. Meanwhile the United States, anxious to strengthen the position of France, one of the principal members of the

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As Others See Us

Western Europe's new mood of independence was reflected in the November 11 editorial of *Gazetta del Popolo* of Turin, an independent conservative newspaper, which stressed that the fate of the European policy of the United States is more in the hands of the Europeans themselves than of the Americans.

No doubt, says the editorial, the Americans are sometimes in the wrong, for instance when "they show signs of losing patience with Russia," but on the other hand the Europeans "do not even try to imagine what would become of them and their pride if they had a Russian proconsul settling every detail of their lives."

"In pushing Europe to unite, the United States has understood and served the interests of Europe better than the Europeans. And it would be unjust to accuse America of not being a model of patience. . . . There is a danger that American patience under Eisenhower will be less than it was under Truman. Eisenhower will continue to be the friend whom Europe knew if it does all it can to facilitate his task; but when all is said and done no one can consider himself obliged to save at any cost

a man who insists on not seeing the abyss opening under his feet. . . . A word to the wise is enough. It is now up to Europe."

In Germany the weekly *Presse-dienst der Heimatvertriebenen*, a weekly bulletin published in Göttingen which represents a moderate and responsible section of opinion among the refugees from Eastern Europe, discussed American policy toward the Eastern bloc on December 4. Indications are, it said, that a more intensive propaganda will attempt to create unrest in the satellite countries and particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia; the "hour of the emigrants" seems to have struck. The bulletin then warns of "the danger that the Americans will resort to emigrant groups who up to now have not shown the least sense of European responsibility."

"This applies not only to the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington, but also to the various groups of Polish exiles in London and America. What they have to offer by way of political plans is nothing but . . . a primitive 'Greater Polish' and 'Czechoslovak' chauvinism. . . . Nor should it be forgotten that the above-mentioned exile groups are strongly anti-German and, above all, approve the terrible crime of the mass expulsions of millions of people."

The article ends by hoping that German diplomacy will pay the closest attention to this and that the Americans will rely for their propaganda behind the Iron Curtain "on those emigrant circles who have recognized that a new Europe can only be built on justice and not on the illusions of power entertained by a selfish chauvinism."

Spotlight

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, opposed in the seventh United Nations General Assembly the moves made by the Asian-Arab bloc to have the UN take action on Tunisia and Morocco. The resulting tension between the West and the Arab world may prove to be a diplomatic victory for the U.S.S.R.

The Prague trials must be examined not only for their implications with respect to Israel and the Arabs, but also for the future of Eastern Europe. Do they indicate an imminent breakdown of communism along the Western border of the U.S.S.R.? Should such a breakdown occur, what are the plans of refugee groups and of the United States? And what would a reshuffle of the balance of power in that area mean for Western Europe?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of three articles on the motives and implications of the Prague trials.)

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

Political Aspects of 19th
Communist Party Congress

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